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Abstract. In some restrictive environments, such as sensor networks, each sen-
sor submits the newest information to the server, every message must be authen-
ticated to immune forgery and replay attacks. But the regular signatures need to
be saved and verified individually, which will heavily add the costs of the com-
putation, storage and communication than the plain text mode in the constraint
devices. Aggregate signature (AS) makes towards solving the above problem be-
cause anyone can aggregate n individual signatures on n distinct messages which
are signed by n distinct signers, into a single compact signature σ.
In this paper, two practical certificateless aggregate signature schemes, which
are the first aggregate signature schemes in the CL-PKC, are proposed from bi-
linear maps. The first scheme CAS-1 reduces the costs of communication and
signer-side computation but loses on the storage, while CAS-2 minimizes the
storage but sacrifices the communication. One can choose either of the above
schemes by the consideration of the implementation requirement. Our schemes
do not need the public key certificate anymore and achieve the trust level 3, the
same level with traditional PKI. Both of the schemes are proven secure in the
random oracle model (ROM) by assuming the intractability of the computational
Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem over the groups with bilinear maps.
Keywords Digital signature, Aggregate signature, Certificateless, Authenti-
cation.
1 Introduction
In nowadays network applications, digital signatures are widely used to pro-
vide authentication and integrity properties on the messages. A well-designed
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signature must be as short as possible to save the communication bandwidth
and storage. In some special applications, such as sensor nets which are used to
detect the status in danger environments, each sensor submits the newest infor-
mation to the server, we need the information is signed by the sensor to immune
forgery and replay attacks which may trigger a false alarm or conceal a real
danger. But this promotion will heavily add the costs of the computation and
communication in the system. From the statistics in [2, 11], each bit transmit-
ted consumes as much power as executing 800-1000 arithmetic instructions. In
these cases, an efficient signature scheme is required that the signatures sizes
and verifications costs are not linearly increase with the number of the signing
messages. Aggregate signature is a reasonable technique towards solving this
problem.
Aggregate Signature. Aggregate signature (AS) scheme, which is first in-
troduced by Boneh et.al in [4], is a digital signature scheme with the addi-
tional property that anyone can aggregate n individual signatures (a sequence
σ1, σ2, · · · , σn) on n distinct messages (m1,m2, · · · ,mn) which are signed by
n distinct signers, into a single compact signature σ. For all i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
each of individual signatures (mi, σi) can check its correctness by the cor-
responding public key pki. There is an aggregate verification algorithm that
takes input {σ, (pki,mi)|i = 1, 2, · · · , n} then returns valid or not. Aggregation
property is useful to reduce computation, communication and storage. Consider
some special environments, such as PDAs, cell phones and sensors, the limita-
tion of battery life is more constraint than the processor speed. An aggregate
signature will be applicable with these communication limited scenarios. We
notice that a digital signature with batch verification [6] goes similar but it does
not have the property that anyone can compact n distinct individual signatures
into a single verifiable signature.
Certificateless Signature. To solve key escrow problem while maintain the
advantages of identity-based public key cryptosystem (ID-PKC) [14, 6], Al-
Riyami and Paterson provided a new certificateless public key cryptosystem
(CL-PKC) in [1]. In contrast to directory-based public key system (DB-PKC),
the user’s public key does not need any certificate to authenticate its validity
since it is self-certificated. In ID-PKC, there is a trusted third party called the
Private Key Generator (PKG) must be completely believed, because PKG is so
powerful that it has the knowledge of all users’ secret keys.
In CL-PKC, there exists a less powerful trusted third party, which is called
Key Generate Center (KGC). KGC has the master-key to generate a user’s par-
tial private key Di, which is computed from the user’s identity IDi. The partial
private key should be securely sent to the user. Afterward, the user adds his
private secret information into the received partial private key, then derives his
full private key Si. Correspondingly, the user combines his secret information
with the KGC’s public key to generate his public key. In this sense, KGC knows
nothing about the user’s private key, which means key escrow problem does not
exist any more.
Table 1. The comparison of the public key cyrptosystems
Cryptosystem DB-PKC ID-PKC CL-PKC
Trust Level Level 3 Level 1 Level 3
Key Distribution Channel Authentic Authentic and Private Authentic
Retrieve Public Key Directory Communication Communication
Public Key includes ID No Yes Yes
After the intuitive work [1], many certificateless public key signature (CL-
PKS) schemes are proposed, such as [17, 12]. The advantages of CL-PKC make
them more competitive and feasible in many practical applications.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we propose two certificateless aggregate sig-
nature (CAS) schemes, which are the first general aggregate signature schemes
in the CL-PKC. The first scheme CAS-1 reduces the costs of communica-
tion and signer-side computation but loses on the storage, while CAS-2 min-
imizes the storage but sacrifices the communication. We can choose one of the
above schemes by the consideration of which advantage is the most important
in the implementation. Compare with the traditional PKI-based scheme [4], our
schemes do not need the public key certificate anymore. According to the CL-
PKC, our schemes achieve the trust level 3 [9], the same level with the tra-
ditional PKI. In formal, both of the schemes are proven secure in the random
oracle model (ROM) by assuming the intractability of the computational Diffie-
Hellman (CDH) problem over the groups with bilinear maps, without using the
forking lemma technique [13].
Related Work. Boneh et. al first introduced an aggregate signature from bi-
linear maps in [3], and then in a survey paper [5], Boneh et. al also presented a
modification version based on [3]. The schemes is very simple, but it has a disad-
vantage that the verification costs will increase linearly (O(n)) with the number
of messages (n) in the aggregated signature. Subsequent to these initial work,
many improved schemes were proposed, such as [7, 15, 16], some of them are
based on ID-PKC. Compares with the certificate-based scheme, identity-based
scheme does not need certificates’ storage and public key verification anymore.
Recently, an efficient identity-based aggregate signature was proposed by Gen-
try and Ramzan in [8]. Their scheme takes advantage that the aggregate verifi-
cation requires only three times pairing computations, regardless of the number
of messages in the aggregated signature.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Bilinear Maps
Our schemes use a bilinear map, which is often called a ”pairing”. Let G1 and
G2 be two additive cyclic groups with the same prime order q. Let eˆ be a bilinear
map such that eˆ : G1 ×G1 ← G2. A map eˆ has the following properties:
1. Bilinear: eˆ(aP, bQ) = eˆ(P,Q)ab, for all P,Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈R Z∗q .
2. Non-degeneracy: eˆ(P,Q) 6= 1G2 .
3. Symmetric: eˆ(P,Q) = eˆ(Q,P ), for all P,Q ∈ G1.
4. Admissible: eˆ(., .) is efficiently computable.
2.2 Computational Assumption
The security of our schemes is based on the assuming intractability of the com-
putational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem.
Definition 1. (CDH Problem). Given P, aP, bP ∈ G1, an admissible pairing
eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2, compute abP (for unknown randomly chosen a, b ∈ Zq).
We say that the CDH problem is (t, ²)-hard if there is no algorithm solved it
in polynomial time at most t with probability no more than ².
2.3 Certificateless Aggregate Signature
Here we give the notion of CAS scheme. The scheme is defined by eight polyno-
mial time bound algorithms: Setup, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Public-Key, Partial-
Private-Key-Extract, Set-Full-Private-Key, Sign, Agg and Ver. Different from
the standard certificateless signature scheme, we use the public key binding
technique in Partial-Private-Key-Extract [1]. Through the binding, the scheme
can achieve the trust level 3 [9], the same level with traditional PKI. Thus in our
schemes, the forgery of one’s public key by a malicious KGC will be detectable
since one public key is binding to one partial private key. Moreover, the private
channel between KGC and user is unnecessary (just need an authentic channel).
The details of the algorithms describe as follows.
1. Setup: This algorithm inputs security parameter k, then returns the system
parameters params and KGC’s secret value master-key.
2. Set-Secret-Value: This algorithm inputs params and IDA, outputs A’s
secret value xA.
3. Set-Public-Key: This algorithm inputs params and xA, outputs A’s public
key PA.
4. Partial-Private-Key-Extract: This algorithm inputs params, master-key,
public key PA and an identifier IDA for entity A, returns a partial private
key DA.
5. Set-Full-Private-Key: This algorithm inputs params, DA and xA, outputs
A’s full private key SA.
6. Sign: This algorithm inputs an accepted message m, params, a user’s iden-
tifier IDi and the full private key Si, outputs a signature σi.
7. Agg: For i = 1, 2, · · · , n, inputs n distinct users’ public keys and identifiers
{(Pi, IDi)|i = 1, 2, · · · , n}, n distinct messages {mi|i = 1, 2, · · · , n} and
n individual signatures {σi|i = 1, 2, · · · , n}, outputs a condensed signature
σ.
8. Ver: For i = 1, 2, · · · , n, inputs n distinct messages {mi|i = 1, 2, · · · , n},
a condensed signature σ, params, n distinct users’ public keys and iden-
tifiers {(Pi, IDi)|i = 1, 2, · · · , n}, outputs true if the signature σ is valid,
otherwise returns false.
Due to the notion of aggregate signature [4], an aggregate signature σ is
declared valid only if the aggregator who created σ was given all valid individual
signatures {σi|i = 1, 2, · · · , n}. Thus, an aggregate signature provides non-
repudiation at once on many different messages by many users.
2.4 Security Model of Certificateless Aggregate Signature Schemes
In CL-PKC, there are two types of adversaries with different capabilities [1].
In our security analysis, These adversaries are also imported to simulate the
adaptive chosen-message attack. A CAS scheme should be secure against the
existential forgery under these adaptive adversaries.
TYPE-I Adversary : This type of adversary AI can not access the KGC’s
master-key, but has the ability to replace the public key of any entity, because
there are no certificates involved in CL-PKC.
TYPE-II Adversary : This type of adversaryAII can access the KGC’s master-
key, but he has no ability to replace the public key of any entity.
We notice that AI act as a common adaptive forger, while AII is designed
to model the security against a malicious KGC or adversaries who compromised
master-key.
According to the different types of the adversary, we define the following
games between an adversary A ∈ {AI ,AII} and a challenger C.
1. Setup: C takes a security parameter 1k and runs the Setup algorithm, pub-
lishes the resulting system parameters params, and then
– Type-I: C keeps master-key to itself. For any user ID, AI can request
a partial private key of the identifier ID, C responses DID. AI can se-
lect a new secret value x′ and compute the corresponding public key
(X ′ID, Y
′
ID). C will record these replacements (x′, X ′ID, Y ′ID) as valid.
– Type-II: C gives master-key to A.
2. Queries: For any user ID,A can submit a query to C on an arbitrary message
mi. C returns the signature σi which is valid under the user’s public key, and
records the signed message mi in the tape M .
3. Response: After the above experiments, A outputs a valid aggregate sig-
nature σ′, which satisfies Ver((pk1,m1), · · · , (pkn,mn), σ′) = true and
there is at least one message mi, i ∈ {1, · · · , n} that is not recorded on C’s
tape M .
We define the advantage of an adversary A wins the above game as
AdvAgg−CMACAS (A) = Pr[Ver((pk1,m1), · · · , (pkn,mn), σ′) = 1|∃mi 6∈M, i ∈ (1, · · · , n)].
Definition 2. An adversary is (t, ², n, qH , qE , qS)-breaks an CAS scheme if:
there are n individual users; A runs in time at most t; A makes at most qH
times hash queries, qE times partial private key extractions and qS times sign-
ing queries; and AdvAgg−CMACAS (A) is at least ².
Definition 3. A CAS scheme is (t, ², n, qH , qE , qS)-secure against existential
forgery if there is no adversary (t, ², n, qH , qE , qS)-breaks it.
3 Two Certificateless Aggregate Signatures from Bilinear Maps
Here we propose two certificateless aggregate signature schemes, which are de-
noted by CAS-1 and CAS-2, respectively. The first scheme CAS-1 reduces
the costs of communication and signer-side computation but loses on the stor-
age, while CAS-2 minimizes the storage but sacrifices the communication. Be-
fore the detailed description, we give some basic definitions and notions which
will be used in both of the schemes. Let G1 and G2 be two additive cyclic
groups with the same prime order q. Let eˆ be a bilinear map such that eˆ :
G1 × G1 ← G2. Let n be the maximum number of the users in the schemes,
i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}.
3.1 CAS-1 Scheme
Setup: KGC generates system parameters params and secret value master-
key as follows:
1. randomly selects a generator P ∈ G1;
2. chooses a random value s ∈ Z∗q as the master-key, and then computes
Q = sP ;
3. chooses two cryptographic hash functions H1,H2 : {0, 1}∗ → G1;
4. publishes the system parameters params = {G1,G2, eˆ, P,Q,H1,H2}.
Set Secret Value: The i-th user chooses a secret random value xi ∈ G1 and
save xi securely.
Set Public Key: The i-th user computes the user’s public key Pi = (Xi, Yi)
where Xi = xiP and Yi = xiQ. Anyone can check if Pi is valid by the equation
eˆ(Xi, Q) = eˆ(Yi, P ). (1)
Partial Private Key Extract: The i-th user sends his identifier IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗
and the public key Pi to KGC, KGC constructs the partial private key Di =
sH1(IDi||Pi).
Set Full Private Key: When received his partial private key Di from the KGC,
the i-th user computes Si = xiDi as full private key.
Sign: Given an arbitrary message mi ∈ {0, 1}∗, the i-th user processes the
signing algorithm as follows:
1. selects ri ∈R Z∗q , computes Ui = riP ;
2. computes Ti = H2(IDi||mi||Ui);
3. computes Vi = riTi + Si;
4. outputs σi = (Ui, Vi) as the signature on mi.
Aggregate: For n individual signatures given by n distinct users, where n =
1, 2, · · · , the aggregation goes:
1. parses σi into Ui, Vi;
2. computes V =
∑n
i=1 Vi;
3. outputs aggregated signature σ = (U1, U2, · · · , Un, V ).
Verify: Given a signature σ, anyone checks if the equation
eˆ(P, V ) =
n∏
i=1
eˆ(Yi,H1(IDi||Pi)) ·
n∏
i=1
eˆ(Ui, Ti) (2)
holds, where Pi = (Xi, Yi) and Ti = H2(IDi||mi||Ui), and then returns
valid or not. The correctness:
eˆ(P, V ) = eˆ(P,
n∑
i=1
riTi) · eˆ(P,
n∑
i=1
Si)
= eˆ(Yi,
n∑
i=1
H1(IDi||Pi)) · eˆ(P,
n∑
i=1
riTi)
=
n∏
i=1
eˆ(Yi,H1(IDi||Pi)) ·
n∏
i=1
eˆ(Ui, Ti). (3)
3.2 Security Analysis
In the random oracle model, while assuming the intractability of CDH problem
in the groups with bilinear maps, we will prove CAS-1 is existentially unforge-
able in the security model of certificatelss aggregate signatures.
Theorem 1. If there exists an adversaryA can (t, ², n, qH1 , qH2 , qE , qS)-breaks
CAS-1, then we can construct an algorithm B can solve CDH problem in the
polynomial time bound with a non-negligible probability.
Proof. Assume that B is given an instance (q, P, aP, bP ) of the CDH problem,
and will interact with a Type-I adversary A as follows to computes abP .
Setup: B sets the KGC’s params = {G1,G2, eˆ, P,Q,H1,H2}, public key
Q = aP . H1,H2 are two random oracles controlled by B.
Hash Queries: A can make hash query at any time. B maintaining a list to each
random oracle.
For H1-query on (IDi, Pi):
1. If (IDi, Pi) is queried previously, B retrieves (ki,1, li,1) from H1-list.
2. Else, with the probability 1 − 1qH1 , B generates ki,1 ∈R Z
∗
q , li,1 = 0 and
H1-coini = 0; with the probability 1qH1
, B generates ki,1, li,1 ∈R Z∗q and
H1-coini = 1. B logs (IDi, Pi,H1-coini, ki,1, li,1) in the H1-list.
3. B responds with H1(IDi||Pi) = ki,1P + bli,1P .
For H2-query on (IDi,mi, Ui):
1. If (IDi,mi, Ui) is queried previously, B retrieves ki,2 from H2-list.
2. Else, B chooses ki,2 ∈R Zq, then he logs (IDi,mi, Ui, ki,2) in the H2-list.
3. B responds with H2(IDi||mi||Ui) = ki,2P .
Partial Private Key Extraction: ForA asks the partial private key for (IDi, Pi):
1. If (IDi, Pi) is queried previously, B retrieves (H1-coini, ki,1) from H1-list.
2. Else, B makes H1-query on (IDi, Pi).
3. If H1-coini = 0, B responses Di = ki,1Q. If H1-coini = 1, B aborts.
Signing Query: While A requests a signature on (IDi, Pi,mi), B retrieves
H1-coini from H1-list. If H1-coini = 0, B processes as below:
1. selects ri ∈R Zq, computes Ui = riP ;
2. computes Ti = H2(IDi||mi||Ui) = ki,2P ;
3. computes Vi = riTi + S′i, S
′
i = xiki,1Q = ki,1Yi;
4. outputs σi = (Ui, Vi) as the signature on mi.
If H1-coini = 1, B aborts. This is the point that B uses the forgeability of
the adversary A to solve the CDH problem.
Takes B’s answers to the verifying equation (2), it is easily to prove that the
simulation is perfect. If B does not abort during the interaction, the algorithm is
indistinguishable from a legal signer.
Output: After adaptive training, A forges a valid signature σj = (Uj , Vj) on
the message mj and identifier IDi, while mj never showed in the signature
query phase.
If it is not the case that H1-coini = 0, then B returns failure. Since Type-I
adversary can select a new secret value x′ and compute the corresponding public
key (X ′ID, Y
′
ID) for the user ID, we can derive its CDH problem answer bQ from
the following equation.
Vj = rjTj + Si
= rjkj,2P + xis(ki,1P + bli,1P )
= rjkj,2P + ki,1Yi + xili,1bQ. (4)
It is easily to analyze that CAS-1 is also unforgeable against Type-II ad-
versary under the same assumption. The proof goes similar to Theorem 1 and
hence, it is omitted. uunionsq
3.3 CAS-2 Scheme
Here we give the description of CAS-2 scheme. Compares with CAS-1, CAS-
2 minimizes the storage but sacrifices the communication. We notice that the
scheme can be seen as a slight modification version of Gentry and Ramzan’s
identity-based scheme [8].
Setup: KGC generates system parameters params and secret value master-
key as follows:
1. randomly selects a generator P ∈ G1;
2. chooses a random value s ∈ Z∗q as the master-key;
3. chooses three cryptographic hash functions H1,H2,H3 : {0, 1}∗ → G1;
4. publishes the system parameters params = {G1,G2, eˆ, P,Q,H1,H2,H3}.
Set Secret Value: The i-th user chooses a secret random value xi ∈ G1 and
save xi securely.
Set Public Key: The i-th user computes the user’s public key Pi = (Xi, Yi)
where Xi = xiP and Yi = xiQ. Anyone can check if Pi is valid by the equation
(1).
Partial Private Key Extract: The i-th user sends his identifier IDi ∈ {0, 1}∗
and the public key Pi to the KGC, KGC constructs the partial private key Di =
(Di,1, Di,2) for the i-th user, whileDi,1 = sH1(IDi||Xi) andDi,2 = sH1(IDi||Yi).
Set Full Private Key: After received his partial private key Di from the KGC,
the i-th user computes Si,1 = xiDi,1 and Si,2 = xiDi,2, sets Si = (Si,1, Si,2)
as full private key.
Sign: Given an arbitrary message mi ∈ {0, 1}∗, the first user choose α ∈R
G1, Each subsequent signer checks that α has not used. Alternatively, different
signers may arrive at the same α according to a pre-established negotiation. The
i-th user processes the signing algorithm as follows:
1. selects ri ∈R G1, then computes Pα = H2(α);
2. computes cj = H3(IDi,mj , α);
3. computes its signature (α,Ui, Vi), where Ui = riP and Vi = riPα + Si,1+
cjSi,2.
Aggregate: For n individual signatures given by n distinct users, the aggrega-
tion goes:
1. parses σi into Ui, Vi;
2. computes V =
∑n
i=1 Vi;
3. computes U =
∑n
i=1 Ui;
4. outputs aggregated signature σ = (U, V ).
Verify: Given a signature σ, we check if the following equation holds.
eˆ(P, V ) = eˆ(U,Pα) ·
n∏
i=1
eˆ(Yi,H1(IDi||Xi) + ciH1(IDi||Yi)). (5)
This ends the descriptions of CAS-2 scheme. The security analysis is similar
to those of CAS-1 as stated in Section 3.2 and the proof sketch in [8].
Theorem 2. If there exists an adversary A can (t, ², n, qH1 , qH2 , qH3 , qE , qS)-
breaks CAS-2, then we can construct an algorithm B can solve CDH problem
in the polynomial time bound with a non-negligible probability.
Proof. Assume that B is given an instance (q, P, aP, bP ) of the CDH problem,
and will interact with a Type-I adversary A as follows to computes abP .
Setup: B sets the KGC’s params = {G1,G2, eˆ, P,Q,H1,H2}, public key
Q = aP . H1,H2 are two random oracles controlled by B.
Hash Queries: A can make hash query at any time. B maintaining a list to each
random oracle.
For H1-query on (IDi, Pi), where Pi = {Xi, Yi}:
1. If (IDi, Pi) is queried previously, B retrieves (ki,1, li,1) from H1-list.
2. Else, with the probability 1 − 1qH1 , B generates ki,1 ∈R Z
∗
q , li,1 = 0 and
H1-coini = 0; with the probability 1qH1
, B generates ki,1, li,1 ∈R Z∗q and
H1-coini = 1. B logs (IDi, Pi,H1-coini, ki,1, li,1) in the H1-list.
3. B responds with H1(IDi||Xi) = ki,1P and H1(IDi||Yi) = bli,1P .
For H2-query on α:
1. If α is queried before, B retrieves r from the H2-list.
2. Else, B chooses r ∈R G1, then he logs (r, α) in the H3-list.
3. B responds with H2(α) = rP .
For H3-query on (IDi,mi, α):
1. If (IDi,mi, α) is queried previously, B retrieves ki,2 from H3-list.
2. Else, B chooses ki,2 ∈R Zq, then he logs (IDi,mi, α, ki,2) in the H3-list.
3. B responds with H3(IDi,mi, α) = ki,2P .
Partial Private Key Extraction: ForA asks the partial private key for (IDi, Pi):
1. If (IDi, Pi) is queried previously, B retrieves (H1-coini, ki,1, li,1) from H1-
list.
2. Else, B makes H1-query on (IDi, Pi).
3. If H1-coini = 0, B responses Xi = ki,1Q and Yi = bli,1Q. If H1-coini =
1, B aborts.
Signing Query: While A requests a signature on (IDi, Pi,mi), B retrieves
H1-coini from H1-list. If H1-coini = 0, B processes as below:
1. selects ri ∈R Zq, computes Ui = riP ;
2. computes Pα = H2(α);
3. computes cj = H3(IDi,mj , α);
4. computes Vi = riPα + S′i,1 + cjS
′
i,2, where S
′
i,1 = xiki,1Q and S
′
i,2 =
bli,1Yi;
5. outputs σi = (Ui, Vi) as the signature on mi.
If H1-coini = 1, B aborts. This is the point that B uses the forgeability of
the adversary A to solve the CDH problem.
Takes B’s answers to the verifying equation (5), it is easily to prove that the
simulation is perfect. If B does not abort during the interaction, the algorithm is
undistinguishable from a legal signer.
Output: After adaptive training, A forges a valid signature σj = (Uj , Vj) on
the message mj and identifier IDi, while mj never showed in the signature
query phase.
If it is not the case that H1-coini = 0, then B returns failure. Since Type-I
adversary can select a new secret value x′ and compute the corresponding public
key (X ′ID, Y
′
ID) for the user ID, we can derive its CDH problem answer bQ from
the following equation.
Vj = rjPα + S′i,1 + cjS
′
i,2
= rrjP + xiki,1Q+ cjbli,1Yi
= rrjP + ki,1Yi + xicjli,1bQ. (6)
It is easily to derive that CAS-2 is also unforgeable against Type-II ad-
versary under the same assumption. The proof goes similar to Theorem 2 and
hence, it is omitted. uunionsq
4 Performance Comparison
Here we give a performance comparison amongst some related schemes and
ours. In order to show the trade-off for the schemes’ certificateless and the trust
level 3, we choose a PKI-based scheme [4] and an ID-based scheme [8]. More-
over, we also select a general certificateless signature scheme [1] to show the
advantages of aggregation. Tp denotes time for one pairing operation in the
elliptic curve groups. Te denotes time for one exponential operation. n is the
number of the individual signatures. ` denotes the length of a group element.
Table 2. The comparison of the aggregate signature schemes
Boneh03[4] Gentry06[8] Al-Riyami03[1] CAS-1 CAS-2
Sign Costs nTe 3nTe nTp + 3nTe 2nTe 3nTe
Verify Costs (n+ 1)Tp nTe + 3Tp 2nTp + nTe (2n+ 1)Tp nTe + (n+ 2)Tp
Aggregate Length 1` 3` 2n` (n+ 1)` 2`
Certificate Need Not Need Not Need Not Need Not Need
Trust Level 3 1 3 3 3
From Table 2, we can understand that both CAS-1 and CAS-2 pay more
computation costs for realizing certificateless and the trust level 3 simultane-
ously. The trade-off is valuable since an authority in low trust level is unaccept-
able in some implementations, e.g., military networks. Because CAS-1 is less
computation in signing process, so it is feasible for the environments where the
signer side is limited computational ability. Thus CAS-2 is better for the limited
storage applications since its aggregate signature length is a const value.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, two practical certificateless aggregate signature schemes are pro-
posed. One can adaptively choose one of the above schemes by the consideration
of which advantage is the most important in practice. Both of the schemes are
proven secure in the random oracle model (ROM) by assuming the intractability
of the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem over groups with bilinear
maps, without using the forking lemma technique. An interesting open problem
is to design such a scheme based on the CL-PKC that neither the storage nor the
computation costs is linearly increased with the number of the signing messages
or the involving parties.
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